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INTRODUCTION 
For nearly twenty years, the doctrine of willful infringement in 
patent law has received criticism for its detrimental effects on attorney-
client privilege. The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Knorr-Bremse 
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.1 to eliminate the 
“adverse inference”—a contributing cause of this discontent—signifies 
an important recognition by the court that the law of willful infringement 
has frustrated the core purposes of attorney-client privilege, and has 
placed accused infringers in an unfair litigation posture for many years. 
Yet while the court attempts to strike a balance in the equities of patent 
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D. candidate, 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, Haverford 
College. Special thanks to Professor Frank Pasquale, Austin Berry, Marissa Quigley, and 
Aili Monahan for their ideas and contributions to this comment. 
 1 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
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infringement litigation, it should remain mindful that, although it has 
changed the rules of the game, its holding has not necessarily eliminated 
the inherent unbalance of willful infringement determinations. The 
Federal Circuit’s decision to eliminate the “adverse inference” was 
merely a cosmetic change in patent litigation because, to defeat a claim 
of willful infringement, accused infringers likely will continue to obtain 
and produce exculpatory opinions, and thereby waive their attorney-
client privilege. Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s intent in Knorr-Bremse, 
the court has done little to reduce the “inappropriate burdens on the 
attorney-client relationship”;2 therefore, it must do more to resolve this 
dilemma. 
Adopted by the Federal Circuit in 1986, the “adverse inference” 3 
became a potent factor in a court’s evaluation of a willful patent 
infringement claim. When faced with an allegation of willful 
infringement of another’s patent, an alleged infringer would often obtain 
an opinion from an attorney to evaluate the claim.4 Before Knorr-
Bremse, obtaining an opinion was viewed as being “close to 
compulsory,”5 because if the dispute proceeded to trial, an accused 
infringer would rely on the opinion as exculpatory evidence that 
infringement was not willful. Production of the opinion, however, 
necessarily resulted in a waiver of the infringer’s attorney-client 
privilege and possibly work-product protection for related documents.6 
Even worse, if an accused infringer did not seek an opinion of counsel, 
or if the accused infringer obtained an opinion yet did not produce it, 
courts were free to infer that the infringement was willful and, in its 
                                                                                                             
 2 Id. at 1343. 
 3 See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986), 
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Federal Circuit held that the defendant’s “silence on 
the subject, in alleged reliance on the attorney-client privilege, would warrant the 
conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its 
importation and sale of the accused products would be an infringement of valid U.S. 
patents.” Id. The Federal Circuit first used the term “adverse inference,” in the context of 
willful infringement, in Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 4 Obtaining an opinion of counsel was a necessity even before the creation of the 
“adverse inference,” because three years prior, in Underwater Devices, Inc., v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the Federal Circuit created an “affirmative 
duty” that forced potential infringers, who acquired actual notice of a patent, “to exercise 
due care to determine whether or not he is infringing.”  Id. at 1389-90. 
 5 Terra Novo, Inc. v. Golden Gate Prods., Inc., No. C-03-2684 MMC EDL, 2004 
WL 2254559, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004). 
 6 Jared Goff, Comment, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from the 
Advice-of-Counsel Defense to Willful Patent Infringement, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 218 
(1998). 
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discretion, award substantially increased damages.7 This presumption, 
known as the “adverse inference,” forced an accused infringer to weigh 
the risks of countering a strong inference of willful infringement—if it 
did not produce an exculpatory opinion—against the risks of privilege 
waiver on a party’s efforts to develop a viable infringement defense after 
having been forced to tip its cards to its adversary in accordance with 
discovery orders. Privilege waiver was undesirable because alleged 
infringers risked the disclosure of valuable litigation strategies which 
may have been embedded in the newly discoverable documents.8 This 
dilemma—which some commentators have characterized as a “Catch-
22”9 and “Hobson’s choice”10—long put alleged infringers in a 
frustrating, and arguably “unfair,”11 position. 
                                                                                                             
 7 See Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1580; see also Fromson v. Western Litho Plate 
and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Where the infringer fails to 
introduce an exculpatory opinion of counsel at trial, a court must be free to infer that 
either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was contrary to the 
infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of the patentee’s invention.”), overruled by 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 8 See ETHAN HORWITZ & LESTER HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & 
TACTICS, PATENT LAW & PRACTICE § 9-07[13][a], 9-120.4 (1971 & Supp. 2003). Waiver, 
understandably, is an unappealing option when “[a] typical document request, with 
respect to willful infringement, would request the production of the following: ‘any and 
all opinion from counsel and any and all documents referring to or embodying opinions 
form counsel relating to infringement and/or non-infringement and/or validity and/or 
invalidity of U.S. Patent_______ and/or any claim thereof.’”  Id. 
 9 Douglas D. Salyers, The Perils of Practitioners Penning Patent Opinion, 
Protecting Privilege, Preventing Production, and Other Ponderous Problems, 619 
PLI/PAT 955, 976 (2004) (“Defendants that have an opinion of counsel face a Catch-22 in 
deciding if and when to produce the opinion during discovery. Producing the opinions 
reveals tactical defenses and legal strategies and opens up the door to complicated waiver 
of privilege issues. Withholding the opinion leads to a negative inference of willfulness 
and counsel’s argument that the infringer has something to hide.”). Id. 
 10 Donald R. Dunner & Richard L. Rainey, Opinions of Counsel, Privilege in Patent 
Litigation and Prejudice from Claiming Privilege, 376 PLI/PAT 285, 288 (1993). A 
“Hobson’s choice” is defined as “the absence of a real alternative.” RANDOM HOUSE 
WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 909 (2d ed. 1998). The term derives from Thomas 
Hobson, a seventeenth-century English liveryman, who required his customers to rent 
either the horse that was nearest the stable door or nothing at all.  Id. 
 11 William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and Addressing the 
Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 393, 434 (2004). The following hypothetical exchange, between a small company 
manager and a patent attorney, appropriately illustrates the “Catch-22” of an accused 
infringer: 
 Imagine you were managing a small company before [the Federal 
Circuit’s Knorr-Bremse decision]. One day a letter arrives, most likely on 
law firm stationary and sent by registered mail. 
 The letter informs you of a patent that the owner—whose sole business 
may be enforcement of patents—insists your company is infringing. The 
letter presents a choice: Stop what you are doing, or take a royalty-bearing 
272 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:269 
In this comment, I investigate the effects of the “adverse inference” 
on patent litigation strategy before and after the Federal Circuit’s recent 
decision in Knorr-Bremse. I begin by exploring the contours of willful 
infringement claims in patent litigation and the origins of the “adverse 
inference” as formulated by the Federal Circuit. Later, I examine the 
effects of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Knorr-Bremse decisions on alleged 
infringers who were compelled to strategize a defense in light of the 
permissible adverse inference. An examination into the effects of the 
adverse inference prior to Knorr-Bremse will serve as a useful 
comparison to the state of willful infringement litigation after the Federal 
Circuit’s decision. Next, I discuss the Federal Circuit’s long-anticipated 
decision in Knorr-Bremse, consider the immediate effects of the holding, 
and examine whether, and to what extent, the landscape of patent 
infringement litigation has changed. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Knorr-Bremse will do little to relieve the dilemma faced by 
                                                                                                             
license (usually accompanied by a steep “sign-up” fee). The letter informs 
you that if your company continues on its current course, it will be willfully 
infringing the owner’s patent rights and may be liable for up to treble 
damages. 
 You consult with your patent counsel and learn that your company needs 
to investigate the claim made in this notice letter and may need to negotiate 
a license. If your company concludes that the patent is invalid or that your 
activities do not infringe, you may certainly choose to not pay the licensing 
fee – but you should still obtain an exculpatory opinion from your patent 
counsel to defend against a charge of willful infringement 
 “How much,” you wonder aloud, “will such an opinion cost?” 
 “Well,” replies your counsel, “there is a broad range, but you should 
think in the range of $10,000 to $100,000.” 
 “Because they sent us a simple letter?” – a letter that you later learn was 
mailed to you and everyone else in your industry. 
 “Yes,” she patiently explains. “Under current law, you not only have a 
duty to avoid infringement, but if you have reason to believe you may be 
infringing, you also must obtain an exculpatory opinion. The opinion should 
show that after careful consideration of the patents and your products, 
counsel concludes that your activities are legal.” 
 “Do you mean that for the cost of that letter, they can force an entire 
industry to go through this?  Why, this is blackmail!” 
 “It gets worse,” your counsel says. “If they sue, you have to waive the 
attorney-client privilege in the opinion, or the judge will all but assume 
you’re a willful infringer.” 
 “And,” she continues, “you can expect the patent owner to use the 
waiver to attempt to obtain discovery of your communications with all the 
lawyers involved in your defense.” 
 You shake your head in disbelief. 
Paul Devinsky & Stephen Becker, Ding Dong, The Inference Is Dead: When Knorr-
Bremse Killed the Adverse Inference Rule, Accused Patent Infringers Got Their Attorney-
Client Privilege Back, 27 Legal Times 43, Oct. 25. 2004, available at 
http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/legaltimes1004.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
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accused patent infringers when put on notice of another’s patent. I finish, 
therefore, by offering an alternative approach for the Federal Circuit that 
would accomplish the goals that the court set out, yet failed, to achieve in 
Knorr-Bremse. 
I. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND THE “ADVERSE INFERENCE” 
The sine qua non of patent ownership is the right to exclude others 
from doing a specific act for a finite period of time.12 Infringement is a 
violation of a patentee’s right to exclude.13 Generally, the goal of patent 
infringement remedies is both to compensate a patentee for losses that 
result from infringing activity, and to deter future infringement.14 A 
patent owner can recover losses through compensatory damages, which 
are limited to amounts “adequate to compensate for the infringement.”15 
Awards of punitive damages, attorney fees, and injunctions are remedies 
that are designed to deter future infringement.16 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 
284, federal district courts are given the discretionary power to award 
punitive damages by increasing compensatory “damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed.” The statute itself provides no 
criterion to determine when such trebled damages are appropriate.17 Yet 
                                                                                                             
 12 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (granting a patent owner “the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States or importing the invention into the United States”). Under 23 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2), 
patent owners maintain this monopoly for a limited term “beginning on the date on which 
the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the 
patent was filed in the United States.” 
 13 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (providing “whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent”) (emphasis added). 
 14 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 26 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. ed., 3d ed. 2004). 
 15 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than 
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with 
interest and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury, the 
court shall assess them.”). In addition, a court may award reasonable attorney fees, 
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, if it finds that an infringer’s willful infringement constitutes 
an “exceptional case.”  Although attorney fees are not punitive in nature, the Federal 
Circuit has employed the same standard for the award of attorney fees as it does for 
willfulness. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 
F.3d 1337, 1348 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Judge Dyk concurring-in-part and 
dissenting-in-part) (citing Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 16 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1284. 
 17 See SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(noting that § 284 “prescribes no standards for such increase”); see also Jurgens v. CBK, 
274 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 1:269 
it is well established that a finding of willful infringement18 provides an 
appropriate basis for such increased damages under this provision.19 
Enhancement of damages under § 284 is a two-step process.20 
“First, the fact-finder must determine if an accused infringer is guilty of 
conduct, such as willfulness, upon which increased damages may be 
based.”21 If such conduct is found, “the court then exercises its discretion 
to determine if the damages should be increased given the totality of the 
                                                                                                             
Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that § 284 “gives the court discretion to 
[increase damages] but gives no criteria for doing so”). 
 18 As early as 1983, the Federal Circuit in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) recognized that it is not 
inappropriate to award treble damages following a finding of willful infringement. Later, 
in Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986), 
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc), the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]f infringement [is] 
accidental or innocent, increased damages are not awarded for the infringement. If 
infringement [is] willful, increased damages ‘may’ be awarded at the discretion of the 
district court, and the amount of increase may be set in the exercise of that same 
discretion.”  Bad faith may also serve as a basis for enhanced damages. See Jurgens, 80 
F.3d at 1570. But as the Federal Circuit has noted, the notion of “bad faith” with respect 
to increased damages under § 284 “is sometimes misunderstood because the term ‘bad 
faith’ has numerous patent law applications.”  Id. Because “bad faith” in this context 
“properly refers to an infringer’s failure to meet his affirmative duty to use due care in 
avoiding infringement of another’s patent rights,” (citing Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d 
at 1389-90), the court noted, “‘bad faith’ is more correctly called ‘bad faith 
infringement,’ and it is merely a type of willful infringement.”  Id. at 1571. 
 19 Patent law is not the only area in intellectual property that permits enhancement of 
damages for willful infringement. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, ENDING 
PATENT LAW’S WILLFULNESS GAME, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1089 & n.5 (2003). 
Enhanced damages are permitted in copyright law, however, a court may only increase a 
damage award up to $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000). Under the same provision, a 
judge also maintains the discretion to remit a damage award to as little as $200 if the 
court finds that the “infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her 
acts constituted an infringement of copyright.”  Id. In trademark law, a plaintiff may elect 
to recover statutory damages in cases involving counterfeit marks. 15 U.S.C § 1117(c) 
(2000). If a court determines that the counterfeiting was willful, it may award up to 
“$1,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or 
distributed.”  15 U.S.C § 1117(c)(2) (2000). 
 20 See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); see also Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1570. 
 21 Mentor H/S, 244 F.3d at 1380. This finding of fact is reviewed on appeal only for 
clear error. State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(citing Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
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circumstances.”22 A finding of willfulness in the first step, however, 
“does not by any means compel an award of enhanced damages.”23 
A finding of willfulness must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.24 A party can not be held liable for infringement of a 
“nonexistent patent.”25 Yet, for issued patents, “a party cannot be found 
to have willfully infringed a patent of which the party had no 
knowledge.”26 This is because willfulness is “by definition a question of 
the actor’s intent.”27 Actual notice of another’s patent may be found, for 
example, where “the patent owner offered the infringer a license, where 
verbal notice of infringement was accompanied by presentation of a copy 
of the patent, and where there was notification by a third party.”28 There 
is no “universal rule,” however, “that to avoid willfulness one must cease 
manufacture of a product immediately upon learning of a patent, or upon 
receipt of a patentee’s charge of infringement, or upon the filing of 
suit.”29 
Although the generally accepted view is that willfulness “depends 
upon the state of mind of the infringer,”30 there is no fixed degree of 
culpability required to establish it.31 The Federal Circuit has noted that 
“‘[w]illfulness’ in infringement, as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, 
but [rather] one of degree,” because “infringement may range from 
unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a 
patentee’s legal rights.”32 “The law of willful infringement,” the Federal 
Circuit has noted, “does not search for minimally tolerable behavior, but 
                                                                                                             
 22 Mentor H/S, 244 F.3d at 1380. An award of increased damages “is committed to 
the sound discretion of the district court, and ‘will not be overturned absent a clear 
showing of abuse of discretion.’”  State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Modine Mfg. Co., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 23 State Indus., 948 F.2d at 1576. See also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 
1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A] finding of willfulness does not always lead to the 
award of increased damages and attorney fees.”). 
 24 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1439-40 
(Fed Cir. 1988) (citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 
613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 25 Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 26 Id. at 511. 
 27 Id. at 510. 
 28 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1367. “Circumstantial evidence can be used 
to prove an infringer’s knowledge of the patent.”  HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 8, § 
9.07[4], 9-74 (citing Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 626 F. Supp. 
667, 767 (M.D.N.C. 1985), aff’d, 800 F.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 29 Gustafson, 897 F.2d at 511. 
 30 HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 8, § 9.07[1], 9-69 (citing Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. 
GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir.1986)). 
 31 See Lee & Cogswell, supra note 11 at 397-99. 
 32 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-56 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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requires prudent, and ethical, legal and commercial actions.”33 
Consequently, “precedent displays the consistent theme of whether a 
prudent person would have had sound reason to believe that the patent 
was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and would be held so 
if litigated.”34 
The Federal Circuit, however, has not adopted a strict test to 
evaluate the presence of willfulness because a trial judge is in an ideal 
position “to weigh considerations such as the closeness of the case, the 
tactics of counsel, the conduct of the parties, and any other factors that 
may contribute to a fair allocation of the burdens of litigation as between 
winner and loser.”35 An evaluation of willfulness, therefore, necessitates 
a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances,”36 which may 
include “contributions of several factors.”37 
In Bott v. Four Star Corp.,38 the Federal Circuit identified three 
factors to determine whether an infringer had “acted in [such] bad faith 
as to merit an increase in damages awarded against him,” including “(1) 
whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another, 
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection, 
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it 
was invalid or that it was not infringed, and (3) the infringing behavior as 
a party to the litigation.”39 In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit reiterated the Bott Factors, and offered six additional factors that 
a trier of fact may consider as indicia of willfulness in a totality of the 
circumstances determination.40 These include: “(4) the defendant’s size 
and financial condition,” “(5) closeness of the case,” “(6) duration of 
                                                                                                             
 33 SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 34 Id. “The primary consideration [in a willfulness determination] is whether the 
infringer had sound reason to believe that he or she had the right to act in the manner that 
was later found to be infringing.” CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1365 (emphasis 
added). 
 35 S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). And, in fact, once a trial judge makes a willfulness determination, which “is often 
accompanied by questions of intent, belief, and credibility,” precedent dictates that 
appellate review provide “appropriate deference to the special role of the trial court in 
making such determination. Thus a finding of willful infringement will be sustained 
unless the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the trier of fact erred.”  
SRI Int’l, 819 F.3d at 1465 (citations omitted). 
 36 Underwater Devices, Inc., v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d, 1380, 1390 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983). 
 37 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations omitted). 
 38 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds, A.C. 
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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defendant’s misconduct,” “(7) remedial action by the defendant,” “(8) 
defendant’s motivation for harm,” and “(9) whether defendant attempted 
to conceal its misconduct.”41 Obtaining competent legal advice “before 
infringing or continuing to infringe” is another significant element in a 
court’s totality of the circumstances review.42 Considered together, these 
factors “assist the trial court in evaluating the degree of the infringer’s 
culpability and in determining whether to exercise its discretion to award 
enhanced damages and how much the damages should be increased.”43 
The Federal Circuit was created,44 in part, in response to the 
“widespread disregard of patent rights” which Congress felt “was 
undermining the national innovation incentive.”45 Congress hoped that 
the introduction of a single appellate court that would maintain the 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over most cases involving patent issues 
would help reduce a number of damaging trends in patent law including 
“forum shopping in patent litigation, a lack of uniformity in . . . patent 
laws, and a high invalidity rate amount litigated patents.”46 
Shortly after its formation, the Federal Circuit was quick to address 
the issue of willful patent infringement in Underwater Devices Inc. v. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co. Inc.47 when the court established a strong 
precedent in an attempt to re-invigorate the legal obligation to respect 
patent rights.48 The court held that potential patent infringers who have 
actual notice of another’s patent rights, have “an affirmative duty to 
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing,” including 
“the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before 
the initiation of any possible infringing activity.”49 Commentators have 
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. (citations omitted). 
 42 Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir.1986). 
“The duty of due care normally requires that a potential infringer obtain competent legal 
advice before infringing or continuing to infringe.”  Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 
F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 43 Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 828. 
 44 In 1982, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 
Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), created the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), by Consolidating the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims. 
 45 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 46 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 26. 
 47 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 48 See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343. 
 49 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90. Also note that prior to the Federal 
Circuit’s rule formulation in Underwater Devices, “four U.S. Courts of Appeal had 
issued opinions that can be interpreted as holding that accused infringers have an 
affirmative duty to obtain a written opinion of counsel.”  Matthew D. Powers & Steven 
C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 75 (2001) (citing Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 677 
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noted that this rule has gone largely unexamined; “the affirmative duty 
rule is a concept that crept its way into the law, but that has not been 
subject to critical examination.”50 
While the presence or absence of willfulness must be evaluated 
under a “totality of the circumstances” standard,51 as a practical matter, it 
can be difficult for an alleged infringer to prove a lack of willfulness 
because “willfulness is a determination as to a state of mind.”52 It 
therefore becomes crucial for an alleged infringer to provide some 
evidence of his good faith and reasonable belief that he was not 
infringing. While a lack of competent legal advice did “not mandate a 
finding of willfulness,”53 it was generally not enough for an alleged 
infringer to counter a willful infringement complaint simply by stating 
that legal counsel was obtained. In order to use the acquisition of legal 
counsel as a defense to willfulness, in satisfaction of the “affirmative 
duty” created in Underwater Devices, an alleged infringer was required 
to submit an exculpatory opinion into evidence.54 
In a willful infringement evaluation, a court does not focus on the 
legal correctness of an attorney’s opinion.55 Instead, the court asks 
whether the “counsel’s opinion [is] thorough enough, as combined with 
other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might 
reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable.56 
Other factors that are relevant in this inquiry are: 
when the infringer sought counsel’s advice (before or after 
commencing the infringing activities); the infringer’s 
knowledge of the attorney’s independence, skill and 
competence; the infringer’s knowledge of the nature and 
extent of analysis performed by counsel in providing the 
opinion; and whether the opinion contains sufficient internal 
                                                                                                             
F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1982); Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Communications, 623 F.2d 
645, 652 (10th Cir. 1980); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Son’s, Inc., 461 F.2d 66 
(3d Cir. 1972); Coleman Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 233 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1956)). 
 50 Powers & Steven, supra note 49, at 76. 
 51 Central Soya Co. v. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 52 Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 53 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 54 It is, therefore, generally advisable that counsel opinion “be drafted with the 
possibility that not only will it be relied on to rebut an allegation of willfulness but that it 
will also be available to a jury, if one is requested, at the liability stage of the trial.”  
Hence, “while the opinion should be accurate and reasoned it should not be couched in 
language which will be seized upon as a basis for the patentee to point out to the jury that 
the accused infringer admits or concedes this or that issue.” HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra 
note 8, § 9.07[10][i], 9-112. 
 55 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Indeed, the 
question arises only where the counsel was wrong.”  Id. 
 56 Id. at 944. 
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indicia of credibility, including a validity analysis predicated 
on a review of the file histories, and an infringement analysis 
that compares and contrasts the potentially infringing method 
or apparatus with the patented inventions.57 
Although legal correctness is not a requirement, the thoroughness 
and competency of an opinion letter is crucial to a defendant’s use of an 
exculpatory opinion to defend against a claim of willfulness, otherwise 
“it is of little value in showing the good faith belief of the infringer.”58 
                                                                                                             
 57 Thorn Emi N. Am., Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Del. 
1993). 
 58 Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). Although legal correctness is not a requirement for a defendant to form a good 
faith belief that he is not infringing, or that the accuser’s patent is invalid, a court will 
nevertheless consider “[f]actors that bear on the competency of an opinion letter 
includ[ing] whether counsel examined the file history of the patent, whether the opinion 
was oral or written, whether the opinion came from inside or outside counsel, whether the 
opinion came from a patent attorney, whether the opinion was detailed or merely 
conclusory, and whether material information was withheld from the attorney.” See 
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1366. An incompetent exculpatory opinion, judged on 
these and other factors, can be damaging to an accused infringer if, based on the 
incompetent opinion, a court determines that a good faith belief could not reasonably 
have been formed. There are many other pertinent factors a court may find “helpful in 
establishing indicia of competency and authoritativeness.”  HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra 
note 8, § 9.07[10], 9-118. These include: 
• the opinion evidences an adequate foundation based on a review of all 
necessary facts and is not merely conclusory on its face, presenting only 
a superficial or off-the-cuff analysis. 
• the opinion indicates that it is based on a review of the file history of the 
patent, the prior art of record, and, possibly, additional prior art. Thus, 
the opinions evidence an adequate foundation. 
• the opinion indicated tests, experiments and studies performed in 
connection with the advice or known otherwise. 
• the validity and infringement issues are analyzed in detail, including 
discussions of the prior art, the accused device, and the claim language. 
• the claims are not discussed as a group but are separately analyzed. 
• there is separate discussion of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
• the opinion sets forth a discussion of the applicable case law. 
• the opinion sets forth a discussion of possible inequitable conduct. 
• the opinion sets forth the standard of one skilled in the art. 
• the opinion indicates that every possible way in which the patent could 
be infringed has been investigated. 
• the opinion’s technological premises and facts have been checked for 
accuracy and care taken to ensure that all relevant information has been 
set forth in the opinion. 
• the opinion is in writing and is not an offhand one. 
• the opinion’s asserted defenses can be backed up with viable proof at 
trial. 
• whether the opinion is of in-house counsel or outside counsel it can be 
established that the person rendering the opinion clearly acts 
independently? 
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In light of the alleged infringer’s affirmative duty to seek competent 
legal advice, and the practical difficulty of evaluating the subjective 
intent of an accused infringer who does not waive privilege, the Federal 
Circuit created a willfulness presumption, known as the “adverse 
inference,”59 to ferret out information about the defendant’s state of 
mind.60 In Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc. the court held that an 
infringer’s silence on the subject of competent legal advice warranted the 
conclusion that no advice was obtained, or if it was obtained, it was 
negative.61 Later, in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., the 
court reaffirmed its prior holding noting that a “court must be free to 
                                                                                                             
• the opinion is rendered by U.S. counsel who is proficient in patent 
matters. 
• while the opinion speaks of probabilities rather than certainties the 
opinion sets forth a reasonable degree of certainty that warrants the 
conclusion that there is a legal right to conduct the infringing activity. 
• if the opinion concludes that the patent claims are invalid for 
obviousness the opinion considers defendant’s copying and other 
secondary objective indicia of unobviousness, which factors precedent 
require be considered. 
• the opinion conclusion that the patent claims are invalid for obviousness 
is not based solely on file history prior art on arguments previously put 
forth by the examiner. 
• the opinion is sought promptly after learning of the possible 
infringement or is elicited before starting potential infringing activities. 
• the opinion initiated efforts to design around the patent claims. 
Id. § 9.07[10], 9-118 to 9-119. 
 59 See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986), 
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 60 It appears as though the key justification for requiring this behavior, on the part of 
defendants, was that alleged infringers already had an affirmative duty under Underwater 
Devices to obtain counsel. In other areas of intellectually property, however, such a 
punative inference is generally considered inappropriate. For example, in a trademark 
dilution case, the Second Circuit asserted that an adverse opinion arising out of a refusal 
to produce an attorney’s opinion is not justified. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 
F.3d 208, 225-26 (2d Cir.1999) overruled on other grounds Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, 
537 U.S. 418 (2003). The Second Circuit noted that “if refusal to produce an attorney’s 
opinion letter based on claim of the privilege supported an adverse inference, persons 
would be discouraged from seeking opinions, or lawyers would be discouraged from 
giving honest opinions. Such a penalty for invocation of the privilege would have 
seriously harmful consequences.”  Id. The court, however, recognized that patent law is 
in a sufficiently different position than trademark law because alleged patent infringers 
maintain a “legal duty to obtain an attorney’s opinion.”  Id. at 226. 
 61 Id. Also note that in dicta, the Federal Circuit in Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. 
Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985) alluded to the possibility of 
a negative inference. The Federal Circuit did not award increased damages based on the 
patentee’s allegation of willfulness, thus deferring to the trial court’s denial, however it 
noted that “[a] record devoid of opinions of counsel and silent on [the infringer’s] 
reaction to the existence of the [patentee’s] patents may indeed lead to negative 
inferences . . . .” See Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 80. 
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infer that either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, 
it was contrary to the infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of 
the patentee’s invention.”62 The immediate affects of the adverse 
inference is to make the “presence or absence of an opinion letter” an 
important element of the trial.63 While the Federal Circuit’s affirmative 
duty rule, articulated in Underwater Devices, imposes obligations on 
alleged infringers to exercise due care and to obtain legal advice, the 
ability to impose the “adverse inference” of willful infringement 
“provides a mechanism to enforce this duty.”64 Consequently, companies 
looking to avoid discovery by a patentee into their privileged attorney-
client communications may be further deterred “from deliberately 
ignoring allegations of patent infringement and from withholding 
royalties when a patent is valid and infringed.”65 
II. THE PRE-KNORR-BREMSE EFFECTS OF THE WILLFULNESS  
DILEMMA ON PATENT PRACTICE 
While the “adverse inference” was a logical extension by the 
Federal Circuit to enforce the “affirmative duty,” the presumption 
generated many unintended consequences on patent infringement 
litigation. Importantly, the inference has had the effect of “compelling 
essentially all alleged infringers, regardless of culpability, to surrender 
their attorney-client privilege.”66 This near-mandatory requirement is 
said to have created “inappropriate”67 burdens on attorney-client 
relationships. 
The adverse inference rule provides patent owners with a 
substantial incentive to allege willful infringement because of the ability 
                                                                                                             
 62 Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 
1988), overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 
383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). “Equally certain is that a court may draw 
certain inferences from an infringement defendant’s failure to introduce an exculpatory 
opinion of counsel at trial.”  Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 919 F. Supp. 911, 942 
(E.D. Va. 1996), vacated, 116 F.3d 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 63 Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 81. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 99. 
 66 Id. at 83. As one commentator has noted, the adverse inference has created the 
“curious result . . . where an accused infringer could have obtained an opinion, found it 
favorable, but chosen not to waive because of other related problems, and then still 
received an adverse inference.”  John Hintz, Court of Appeals Changes Evidentiary Rule 
Relating to Opinions of Counsel in Patent Cases, INTELL. PROP. UPDATE (Fish & Neave, 
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2004 (on file with author). Consequently, the affirmative duty rule 
can lead to “false positives” and “false negatives.”  Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 
190-91. 
 67 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
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to obtain an increased award of damages and because of the dilemma it 
creates for accused infringers.68 Patent holders rarely hesitate to add a 
count of willfulness in an infringement suit because the necessary burden 
of production to support a willful infringement complaint is low.69 The 
risk of Rule 11 sanctions, on account of wrongfully adding a count of 
willful infringement, is very rare “once he or she has satisfactorily 
alleged a count of patent infringement.”70 Therefore, it should come as 
no surprise that patent owners “regularly”71 allege willful patent 
infringement because plaintiffs have comparatively little to risk when 
alleging willfulness and much to gain. If the alleged infringer waives 
attorney-client privilege, the patentee typically tries to expand the waiver 
to obtain broad discovery.72 In many cases, patent owners are 
“remarkably successful in their quest” to obtain the work product and 
materials communicated by litigation counsel.73 If privilege is not 
waived, the patentee likewise benefits from the inference as a substantial 
method to increase damages, especially in infringement cases where 
compensatory damages may be low because it is difficult to evaluate the 
financial detriment to a patentee. 
The combination of the affirmative duty to seek competent counsel 
and the adverse inference has forced “patent-savvy corporations”74 into 
the common routine of using separate third-party counsel to draft the 
exculpatory opinions.75 Even before it is written, it is expected that the 
opinion may be used at trial by the alleged infringer to defend itself 
against allegations of willful infringement.76 Consequently, only 
communications between the alleged infringer and the third-party 
counsel become discoverable by the plaintiff, allowing the defendant to 
                                                                                                             
 68 One commentator notes that “a charge of willful infringement has become a 
routine adjunct to almost every pleading asserting patent infringement.”  Jon E. Wright, 
Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages – Evolution and Analysis, 
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 97 (2001) (citations omitted). 
 69 See Lee & Cogswell, supra note 11, at 396. 
 70 Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 84. “A review of caselaw indicates that no 
attorney has been sanctioned under Rule 11 for adding a count of willful infringement in 
a complaint once he or she has satisfactorily alleged a count of patent infringement.” Id. 
 71 Nicholas M. Cannella, et al. The Demise of the Adverse Inference Rule in 
Evaluating Willful Infringement?, Intell. Property Today, *5, May 2004. (citing amicus 
briefs prepared for the Federal Circuit’s adjudication on Knorr-Bremse) (on file with 
author). 
 72 See Devinsky & Becker, supra note 11, at 3. 
 73 Id. 
 74 J. Matthew Buchanan, Knorr-Bremse: The Federal Circuit Eliminates the Adverse 
Inference, Promote the Progress, Sept. 14, 2004, http://promotetheprogress.com/ 
archives/2004/09/knorrbremse_the.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 75 See HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 8, § 9.07[10][f], 9-105. 
 76 Id. § 9.07[10][i], 9-112. 
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shield its trial counsel from the burden of attorney-client privilege 
waiver. 
The strategy of using outside counsel to write the exculpatory 
opinion, however, has severe drawbacks. To write an exculpatory 
opinion, a third-party counsel must pick up the defendant’s file and 
conduct exhaustive research to draft a proper evaluation of the alleged 
infringer’s standing on the willfulness issue.77 These opinions typically 
cost at least $20,000 and depending on the complexity of the case, can 
frequently cost over $100,000.78 Exposure of the third-party opinion can 
still hurt the trial counsel if, for instance, the third-party counsel 
discussed in the opinion a particular strategy for litigation.79 At trial, the 
exposure of the third-party opinion could inhibit counsel from executing 
a clear strategy if the exposed opinion prematurely reveals its current 
strategy or, perhaps even worse, if the strategy within the opinion is 
contradictory. From a practical standpoint, knowing that their work 
product may be used at trial and that it could adversely impact the trial 
counsel’s strategy, the third-party counsel may feel “less free to counsel 
their clients, at least in writing, about the risks of their conduct.”80 
Consequently, the adverse inference has had the effect of “restraining the 
[third-party counsel’s] candor in providing advice when the attorney 
knew that his or her advice was likely to be released in the event of 
litigation.”81 
Recognizing the negative impact that the adverse inference had on 
attorney-client relationships, in September 2003, the Federal Circuit 
seized the opportunity, sua sponte, to re-consider the adverse inference in 
light of the precedent it had established in Kloster Speedsteel and 
                                                                                                             
 77 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 1366 
 78 See Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 102. 
 79 Laura M. Kelley, The Adverse Inference Rule and Advice of Counsel in Patent 
Litigation, Triangle Tech Journal, http://www.triangletechjournal.com/news/article. 
html?item_id=614 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). The legal theories used at trial may be 
different than the legal theories discussed in the exculpatory opinion, which may have 
been prepared years before litigation became an issue. Introducing an inconsistent legal 
opinion at trial might confuse a jury or cause the defendant to lose credibility. Also, 
waiver subjects alleged infringer to the production of additional materials. Id. 
 80 See Powers & Carlson, supra note 49, at 191. 
 81 Walter C. Linder & William L. Roberts, Do You Want My Opinion?: What the 
Knorr-Bremse Case Means for Patent Litigation, (Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, 
Minn.), at http://www.faegre.com/articles/article_1428.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). It 
is reasonable to assume that an attorney may supplement his lack of candor on paper with 
clarification to the client orally. Although such communications would likely remain 
secret, in theory, they could become discoverable upon waiver of attorney-client privilege 
following the production of the exculpatory opinion. 
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Underwater Devices.82 The Federal Circuit took, on appeal from the 
Eastern District of Virginia, a patent infringement suit following the 
district court’s finding that two defendants had willfully infringed a 
plaintiff’s air-disk brake patent. At trial, defendant Haldex stated that it 
had obtained counsel about the plaintiff’s patents, but declined to 
produce an exculpatory opinion.83 The other defendant, Dana, stated at 
trial that it did not consult with counsel because it had relied on Haldex’s 
legal advice.84 Accordingly, the district court assumed that Haldex’s 
opinions were unfavorable, and that Dana’s opinion would have been 
unfavorable had it obtained one.85 The court found that the defendants 
had willfully infringed the plaintiff’s patent and awarded attorney fees.86 
In its order for an en banc hearing, the Federal Circuit invited 
parties to submit briefs directed to the following four issues: 
1. When the attorney-client privilege and/or work product 
privilege is invoked by a defendant in an infringement suit,  
is it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an  
adverse inference with respect to willful infringement? 
2. When the defendant has not obtained legal advice, is it 
appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful 
infringement? 
3. If the court concludes that the law should be changed,  
and the adverse inference withdrawn as applied to this  
case, what are the consequences for this case? 
4. Should the existence of a substantial defense to infringement 
be sufficient to defeat liability for willful infringement even  
if no legal advice has been secured?87 
The Federal Circuit aimed the first question at the heart of the its 
holding in Kloster Speedsteel, where the court held that silence as to 
whether it sought advice of counsel warranted the conclusion that advice 
not obtained was bad.88 The second posited question considered the 
court’s earlier holding in Underwater Devices, which established an 
                                                                                                             
 82 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 83 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 
843, 857 (E.D.Va. 2001) (partial summary judgment). 
 84 Id. at 863. 
 85 Id. at 863-64. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d 1336, 
1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court also invited amicus curiae briefs addressing its 
questions. More than twenty-four amici responded. 
 88 Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986), 
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
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affirmative duty on the part of the alleged infringer to seek and obtain 
competent legal advice.89 Anticipating that one or both answers to the 
two prior questions of law may alter the Federal Circuit’s precedent, the 
court asked the parties to determine how the instant suit should be 
affected. Finally, the court’s fourth question asked the parties to propose 
how far the benefit of an elimination of the adverse inference should be 
extended. 
Following the Federal Circuit’s decision to reconsider en banc 
these four questions, there was widespread support in the legal 
community for the elimination of the adverse inference in both 
circumstances where an alleged infringer fails to waive attorney-client 
privilege and fails to seek counsel.90 Amicus briefs argued that “patent 
cases were the only litigation in which relying on attorney-client 
privilege could proactively harm a defendant.”91 Practitioners noted that 
“in the eyes of the community, the adverse inference unfairly 
disadvantaged the defendants and undermined the relationship between 
companies and their patent counsel.”92 The inference has been criticized, 
according to practitioners, because “there are many legitimate reasons for 
not obtaining or producing a legal opinion at trial . . . many of which are 
unrelated to the issue of willfulness.”93 “Without the crutch of the 
adverse inference rule . . . and absent the pressure to release opinions of 
counsel,” it was proposed, “the patent owner’s burden to prove willful 
infringement or to obtain instructive discovery [would] increase[] 
significantly.”94 The elimination of the adverse inference would require 
“[p]atent owners [to] have to find evidence of willful actions taken by the 
accused infringer to meet the totality-of-the-circumstances test – actions 
such as deliberate copying, concealment or infringing activity, 
                                                                                                             
 89 Underwater Devices, Inc., v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
 90 More than twenty-four amici responded “almost unanimously” supporting the 
elimination of the adverse inference. Richard E. Parke, Summary of the Federal Circuit’s 
Opinion in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp., (Frommer Lawrence & Haug, New York, 
N.Y.), at http://www.flhlaw.com/news/news_47.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
 91 Linder & Roberts, supra note 81. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Kelley, supra note 79. As one commentator noted,  
[o]ne common reason for wanting to withhold even a favorable opinion is 
that the arguments counsel wants to make at trial contradict those made in 
the opinion. For example, an opinion letter might interpret the claims of a 
patent narrowly in concluding that there is no infringement, while at trial the 
accused infringer might want to forego that infringement defense because a 
broader understanding of the patent would render it invalid in light of newly 
discovered prior art not available to the lawyer who wrote the opinion. 
Lemley & Tangri, supra note 19, at 1113 n.86. 
 94 Devinsky & Becker, supra note 11, at 3. 
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infringement despite only frivolous defenses, and infringement designed 
to injure a competitor.”95 Nevertheless, patent attorneys generally agreed 
that the “purposes and advantages of obtaining a legal opinion of non-
infringement [would] not be changed”96 if the Federal Circuit were to 
eliminate the adverse inference. 
Although the legal community was unified in its belief that the 
adverse inference should be eliminated, the extent to which patent 
litigation would actually change was less certain. One commentator 
noted that “[e]ven without the coercive pressure of the adverse inference, 
many accused infringers will want to disclose a favorable opinion letter 
and, accordingly, will have no choice but to waive privilege.”97 In 
addition, analysts contended that the elimination of the adverse inference 
still will not remove the “heart of the problem” that alleged infringers 
feel compelled to waive privilege.98 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ELIMINATES THE  
“ADVERSE INFERENCE” IN KNORR-BREMSE 
After considerable anticipation, the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Knorr-Bremse delivered the death knell to the “adverse inference” of 
willful infringement in patent infringement litigation. While recognizing 
that ‘special justification’ was always required for judicial departure 
from stare decisis, the court reasoned that the ‘conceptual underpinnings’ 
of adverse inference precedent “have significantly diminished in force.”99 
                                                                                                             
 95 Id. 
 96 Kelley, supra note 79. 
 97 Lemley & Tangri, supra note 19, at 1115. 
 98 See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 19, 1125.  
But eliminating these rules won’t do away with the heart of the problem. 
That requires reconceptualizing willfulness based on the understanding that 
it is the copying of an invention, not merely competitive business conduct, 
that the law is designed to target. A narrower willfulness doctrine with a 
more limited financial penalty attached to it will more faithfully serve the 
purposes of patent law, and put an end to a longstanding and dangerous 
game. 
Id. 
 99 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 
(1984)). By this, perhaps the court meant that the adverse inference was created in a time 
when patent rights were not well respected. An important contributing factor to this lack 
of respect was the lack of uniformity in patent jurisprudence prior to the consolidation of 
subject matter jurisdiction for patent appeals to Federal Circuit. As one commentator 
noted upon reflection of the legacy of Federal Circuit ten years after its inception, “the 
goal of establishing consistency in the federal judiciary is becoming a reality. The Federal 
Circuit has brought uniformity to patent law.”  Dennis DeConcini, Celebrating the Tenth 
Anniversary of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 
529, 534 (1992). 
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Therefore, “a special rule affecting attorney-client relationships in patent 
cases is not warranted.”100 
In response to the first question posited, the Federal Circuit stated 
concisely that “no adverse inference shall arise from invocation of the 
attorney-client and/or work product privilege.”101 The court asserted that 
this change in law was appropriate in order to curtail the adverse 
inference’s “distort[ion of] the attorney-client relationship.” The court 
cited the Supreme Court’s discussion in Upjohn Co. v. United States,102 
to support the rationale that an unadulterated attorney-client privilege 
promotes justice. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court noted that “full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients” is necessary 
for attorneys to be fully informed about a client.103 An attorney who is 
fully informed is better equipped to provide a client with sound legal 
advice.104 Sound legal advice, in turn, invites “broader public interest[] in 
the observance of law and administration of justice.”105 A client’s 
willingness to communicate fully and frankly, therefore, has substantial 
implications. 
The Federal Circuit asserted that a client’s willingness to 
communicate openly with counsel depends on the individual’s 
confidence that communications will remain privileged.106 The Federal 
Circuit cited Professor Wigmore who noted that clients will “‘rarely 
make disclosure[s] which may be used against him.’”107 The court stated 
that the current state of patent litigation where “the inference that 
withheld opinion are [necessarily] adverse to the client’s actions”108 
forces accused infringers to waive attorney-client privilege, thus creating 
an environment where clients anticipate that communications with their 
attorney will not remain privileged.109 Hence, the Federal Circuit asserted 
that the adverse inference is detrimental to attorney-client privilege, and 
                                                                                                             
 100 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344. 
 101 Id. 
 102 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). (holding that attorney-client privilege applies to 
communications between a corporation’s lawyers and its employees if the information 
discussed is relevant to the attorney’s legal advice to the corporation). It is interesting that 
the Federal Circuit now cites to Upjohn, a Supreme Court case decided in 1981, as 
support for the elimination of the adverse inference that the Federal Circuit created in 
1986, in Kloster Speedsteel. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1345. 
 107 Id. at 1344 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 at 
548 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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the elimination of the adverse inference in this context is appropriate.110 
In circumstances where accused infringers are attempting to determine 
whether or not they are infringing another’s patent, the Federal Circuit 
insisted that “there should be no risk of liability in disclosures to and 
from counsel.”111 
In response to the second question—whether an adverse inference 
is appropriate when a defendant does not obtain legal advice—the 
Federal Circuit “did not mince words”112 when it held “the answer, again, 
is ‘no.’”113 The court stated that “it is inappropriate to draw a similar 
adverse inference from failure to consult counsel.”114 The Federal Circuit 
held that “the failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no 
longer provide an adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such 
an opinion would have been unfavorable.”115 
The court noted that the elimination of the adverse inference in this 
context was not based on any concern for attorney-client privilege.116 
Instead, the court acknowledged that a change in law was appropriate 
based upon the unintended consequences that have emerged in patent 
litigation as a result of some of the Federal Circuit’s prior decisions.117 
The court noted that the effect of some of its decisions has contributed to 
the excessive “burdens and costs” associated with obtaining opinions of 
counsel for “every potentially adverse patent of which the defendant had 
knowledge.”118 The court recognized that the high standard it imposed on 
exculpatory opinions to “fully address all potential infringement and 
validity issues,”119 from its decision in Johns Hopkins University v. 
Cellpro, Inc.120 has contributed to these burdens. The court also 
acknowledged the emergence of “extensive satellite litigation” in patent 
law has an unintended burden of the current law.121 The Federal Circuit, 
therefore, concluded that the “conceptual underpinnings” of the 
affirmative duty of due care, that the court created in Underwater 
Devices and Kloster Speedsteel, had been distorted.122 Although the court 
stressed the continued existence of the “‘duty of care to avoid 
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infringement of the known patent rights of others,’”123 the court held that 
it was “inappropriate to draw a[n] . . . adverse inference from failure to 
consult counsel.124 
The Federal Circuit then turned its attention to the subject matter of 
question three: Haldex’s and Dana Corp.’s appeal. In light of the court’s 
decision to eliminate the adverse inference in scenarios illustrated in 
questions one and two, it chose to vacate the district court’s finding of 
willful infringement and award of attorney fees.125 The court noted that 
the district court had “based its willfulness determination on several 
[factual findings] in addition to the adverse inference arising from [the 
infringer’s] assertion of attorney-client privilege.”126 Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit thought it was appropriate for the district court to 
reconsider the willful infringement claim on remand upon “a fresh 
weighing of the evidence.”127 The district court must consider the totality 
of the circumstances without the benefit of a presumption of willful 
infringement. 
Although Knorr-Bremse will likely be most remembered for the 
Federal Circuit’s elimination of the adverse inference, the legacy of the 
decision, as it pertains to the landscape of patent litigation, may lie in the 
court’s answer to the fourth question. The court held that the existence of 
a substantial defense to infringement was not necessarily sufficient to 
defeat liability for willful infringement if legal advice is not obtained.128 
The court stressed that the question of whether an alleged infringer 
received legal advice should remain a factor to consider in a court’s 
totality of the circumstances inquiry.129 The court noted that it would 
“decline to adopt a per se rule” because, it felt that this ruling would give 
“greater flexibility” to triers of fact when considering all of the 
circumstances.130 Therefore, despite the court’s assertion that an adverse 
inference “flowing from the infringer’s failure to obtain or produce an 
exculpatory opinion of counsel . . . is no longer warranted,”131 the court’s 
answer to the fourth question leaves many of the issues, seemingly 
settled in the first two questions, open again. The court stopped short of 
eliminating all vestiges of the adverse inference. In many ways, this 
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answer simply reaffirms the existing law because the existence of an 
advice of counsel, while it no longer permits a presumptively adverse 
factor, remains an important element in the totality of the circumstances 
inquiry. 
In a concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part opinion, Circuit Judge 
Dyk was sensitive to the issues the court’s opinion did not resolve. Judge 
Dyk concurred with the majority’s opinion to the extent that it eliminated 
the adverse inference when attorney-client privilege is not waived and 
when legal opinion is not obtained.132 Judge Dyk, however, disagreed 
with the majority’s reaffirmance of the affirmative duty to exercise due 
care to determine whether or not one is infringing another’s patent.133 
Dyk stressed that the due care requirement “has produced nothing of 
benefit to the patent system.”134 Enhanced damages are useful “in cases 
where the potential infringer has been guilty of deliberate copying, 
concealment of infringement, or other reprehensible conduct,” Dyk 
noted, but where reprehensible conduct does not exist, a patentee is 
adequately protected from infringers via preliminary injunctive relief. 
Dyk asserted “to stretch the law of punitive damages” in these cases is 
“unnecessary.” Judge Dyk pointed to a list of undesirable consequences 
that have emerged as a result of the affirmative duty of due care. These 
include: “a reluctance” on the part of people in the industry “to review 
patents for fear that the mere knowledge of a patent will lead to a finding 
of lack of due care”; “a cottage industry of window-dressing legal 
opinions by third party counsel designed to protect the real decision-
making process between litigating counsel and the company’s 
executives”; “the imposition of substantial legal costs on companies 
seeking to introduce innovative products”; “and an enhanced ability of 
holders of dubious patents to force competitors’ products off of the 
market through the threat of enhanced damages.” 135 Despite the 
purported elimination of the adverse inference, Judge Dyk concluded that 
the “majority opinion does not address whether a potential infringer can 
satisfy the requirement of due care without securing and disclosing an 
opinion of counsel, or, if such an opinion is not absolutely required, 
                                                                                                             
 132 Id. at 1348 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). 
 133 Id. (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). 
 134 Id. at 1351. (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). Dyk also noted 
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 135 Id. (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). Judge Dyk noted that amici 
and other groups, including the Federal Trade Commission and National Academies, 
have recognized these concerns. 
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whether an adverse inference can be drawn from the accused infringer’s 
failure to obtain and disclose such an opinion.”136 
IV. IMMEDIATE REACTION TO KNORR-BREMSE 
A. Practitioners React 
Immediately following the Knorr-Bremse decision, commentators 
were generally optimistic about the new change in law. One 
commentator suggested that “the entire patent bar seemed to heave a sigh 
of relief,” because “no longer [would] patent counsel face the dreaded 
adverse inference Catch-22.”137 The decision, in one attorney’s opinion, 
“‘reverses the erosion of the attorney-client privilege we’ve seen over the 
past 20 years,’” and “‘essentially restores the protection of attorney-
client privilege.’”138 Another attorney quipped that “‘[t]he Federal 
Circuit just dropped a house on the Wicked Witch of the West.’”139 In his 
opinion, “‘the deck [was] swept clean,’” due to the elimination of the 
adverse inference because “‘[a]ll presumptions are gone, so a defendant 
is no longer guaranteed to lose.’”140 
Law firms also appeared to react positively to the news of the 
Knorr-Bremse decision. In its client newsletter, one firm noted that the 
inference “used to be the ‘thumb on the scale’ that weighed heavily 
against defendants in court.”141 The firm noted that the change in law, 
however, “may have created a more evenly balanced battleground 
between plaintiffs and defendants.”142 Another firm commented that the 
Knorr-Bremse decision “frees those accused of willful infringement from 
the Hobson’s choice of waiving privilege . . . in the face of a virtually 
dispositive adverse inference.”143 Even if a defendant receives a 
favorable opinion of counsel, after the elimination of the adverse 
inference, one firm noted, the defendant may choose to keep its opinions 
secret because otherwise it “effectively opens the barn doors and gives 
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the opposing side the opportunity to seek other privileged documents or 
email related to the invention in discovery.”144 Moreover, if an opinion is 
bad, a defendant should feel more comfortable in its decision to not 
disclose the opinion. Also, in response to a question that the majority 
recognized that it had left open, one firm noted that the elimination of the 
inference may now allow accused infringers to “argue that the mere 
existence of an opinion, even without its production during discovery, 
shows good faith, a factor disproving willfulness.”145 
B. Effects on Existing Cases 
Following the Knorr-Bremse decision, district courts appeared to be 
receptive to the change in law. In at least one instance, while responding 
to a motion to quash a plaintiff’s discovery requests, a district court 
granted a defendant the option to withdraw an advice-of-counsel defense 
the defendant had asserted prior to the Knorr-Bremse decision. The court 
in Terra Novo, Inc., v. Golden Gate Products, Inc.146 recognized that “the 
negative inference,” which existed prior to Knorr-Bremse, “rendered the 
waiver of attorney-client privilege less than voluntary.” The district court 
was therefore willing to give the defendant the choice of either “fil[ing] a 
statement of intent not to rely upon the advice of counsel defense against 
willfulness,” or “submit to the discovery authorized in [the court’s] 
order.”147 
As a result of a general willingness by the courts to give defendants 
the opportunity to benefit from the Federal Circuit’s Knorr-Bremse 
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decision, defendants will likely take advantage of the change of law.148 
Following Knorr-Bremse, however, the Federal Circuit did not intend to 
disturb every appealed decision related to findings of willful 
infringement.149 The Federal Circuit appears willing to provide 
defendants an opportunity to relitigate an unfavorable finding of 
willfulness if the trial court’s decision was significantly affected by a 
pre-Knorr-Bremse adverse inference. But where the adverse inference 
was not a significant factor in the willfulness determination, the court is 
likely to leave the decision undisturbed. 
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 149 In Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), the Federal Circuit left a jury’s willfulness determination untouched even though 
the infringer had not pursued an advice-of-counsel defense. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. 
Jazz Photo Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 434, 456 n.29 (D.N.J. 2003). According to the district 
court, the jury’s willfulness determination was not significantly affected by an adverse 
inference. Id. The district court added “[i]ndeed, no such opinion could exist. While 
ordinarily the absence of an opinion is of critical significance in any willfulness inquiry, 
it is of less importance under the circumstances presented here – i.e. where the alleged 
infringer knew that a particular action would constitute infringement, but claims not to 
have known that it was taking the action.”  Id. Instead, the district court noted, the jury 
could properly have based its willfulness determination on a finding of a lack of 
credibility of the defendant’s only proffered evidence aimed to support his claim that he 
lacked the requisite knowledge to form a willful intent to infringe: his own testimony. Id. 
at 457. Even if the Federal Circuit had vacated the finding of willfulness, however, there 
would have been no obvious benefit to the defendant because at trial the district court, in 
its discretion, did not enhance the damages as a result the jury’s willfulness determination 
anyway. 
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C. Yet What Was Actually Accomplished? 
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Knorr-Bremse likely will 
be remembered for the court’s elimination of the adverse inference that 
had weighed heavily on accused patent infringers for nearly twenty 
years. But what remains unclear is whether the decision, as a practical 
matter, will create an improvement in the landscape of patent litigation 
strategy. The majority opinion grounded its decision to eliminate the 
inference largely in an effort to restore confidence in attorney-client 
relationships, and to reduce some of the unnecessary burdens imposed on 
innovators who may be infringing.150 But despite these laudable 
intentions, some have questioned whether the elimination of the adverse 
inference will actually advance these goals. 
The majority opinion justified its answer to the second question—to 
eliminate the adverse inference in the situation where a defendant failed 
to consult counsel at all—in part on the “burdens and costs” associated 
with the requirement for “early and full study by counsel of every 
potentially adverse patent of which the defendant has knowledge.”151 
However, most commentators and law firms insist that despite this 
holding, an opinion of counsel will still “remain the gold standard among 
defenses to willfulness.”152 In what seems to be a win-win situation for 
law firms, one commentator noted that “Knorr-Bremse should not 
change the corporate best practices in dealing with a known patent which 
presents a potential infringement problem, i.e., to timely obtain a well 
reasoned opinion from a competent patent counsel, preferably from an 
outside counsel.”153 “Therefore, the Knorr-Bremse decision does not alter 
the advisability of obtaining an opinion of counsel for the purpose of 
rebutting a charge of willfulness.”154 This commentator further asserted 
that Knorr-Bremse’s holding “merely makes the absence of an 
exculpatory opinion a neutral factor for determining willful infringement. 
Therefore, the Knorr-Bremse decision does not alter the advisability of 
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obtaining an opinion of counsel for the purpose of rebutting a charge of 
willfulness.”155 
Law firms stand to lose important business if opinions of counsel 
are no longer regularly obtained by clients. Yet firms are probably 
offering their clients good advice. As one commentator aptly noted, even 
though the patentee still carries the burden to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that based on the totality of the circumstances the 
infringement was willful, “evidence that the infringer had relied on and 
followed a well reasoned and timely opinion of competent patent counsel 
is likely to be the best evidence to rebut the charge [of willful 
infringement] by establishing a prudent belief that the infringer’s actions 
were lawful and that the infringer had a good faith belief that he had no 
liability.”156 The commentator further asserted that “in most cases, other 
evidence that the infringer had a prudent belief that what he was doing 
did not violate patent rights is not nearly as persuasive.”157 And further, 
“[i]f the client is willing to spend the money on an opinion at all, [the 
client] will likely go the extra distance to get the outside opinion to 
protect themselves down the line if they, in fact, do want to waive it.”158 
Therefore, if defendants are still likely to seek opinions of outside 
counsel anyway, even after the holding in Knorr-Bremse to eliminate the 
adverse inference when no opinion is obtained, then it appears as though 
the decision actually did little to reduce the burden on defendants. 
Alleged infringers continue to be burdened both financially, by obtaining 
attorney opinions, and strategically, because of the necessary waiver of 
privilege when the opinion is produced as exculpatory evidence. 
The majority opinion justified its answer to the first question—to 
eliminate the adverse inference in situations where a defendant obtains 
an opinion but chooses not to waive privilege—by emphasizing the 
“inappropriate burdens” the adverse inference placed “on the attorney-
client relationship.”159 Yet, in the same opinion, the Federal Circuit did 
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not establish which factors triers of fact should consider in willfulness 
and damage enhancement inquiries.160 Instead, the court reasserted that 
these determinations are to be made “on consideration of the totality of 
the circumstances,” and noted that such determination “may include 
contributions of several factors” the court previously delineated in 
Read.161 In its answer to the fourth question—that the existence of a 
substantial defense to infringement is not necessarily sufficient to defeat 
liability for willful infringement—the court reasoned that triers of fact 
were in a better position “to accord each factor the weight warranted by 
its strength in the particular case.”162 This approach, the court suggested, 
would provide “greater flexibility” for a trier of fact “to fit the decision 
to all of the circumstances.” The court noted that willful infringement, 
“‘as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of degree.’”163 
Yet, by leaving this determination open, the court implicitly 
acknowledged the fact that a lack of privilege waiver by a defendant 
could still have a substantial effect on a court’s willfulness 
determination. Therefore, instead of actually eliminating the 
“inappropriate burden” on defendants, the court appears to have 
reinforced the burden by still leaving a trier of fact with the responsibility 
to consider a defendant’s lack of opinion in the “totality of the 
circumstances” evaluation. 
The reaffirmance of this flexible approach alarmed law firms and 
commentators as well. By providing more flexibility, one law firm article 
noted, the court “left in place . . . a continuing confusion” surrounding 
these determinations.164 Judge Dyk expressed similar criticism for the 
courts unwillingness to provide clear guidance. Because the majority did 
not eliminate the affirmative duty of care, Judge Dyk emphasized, the 
duty of care will remain a critical factor in the willfulness 
determination.165 Consequently, Dyk asserted, “no one can seriously 
doubt that, both in the minds of the jurors (in determining willfulness) 
and in the decision of the district court (concerning enhancement), the 
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duty of care is by far the preeminent factor in the vast majority of 
cases.”166 
In summary, the Federal Circuit eliminated the adverse inference in 
circumstances where a defendant obtains an opinion of counsel but does 
not produce it, and when a defendant does not seek legal counsel at all. 
The court justified this change in law on the negative impacts the 
inference has had on attorney-client relationships, and the excessive 
burdens and costs that are associated with the opinion practice. Yet, 
based on the reaction of the legal community, clients that would obtain 
opinions of counsel in the past, probably still will. This is because, 
despite the court’s decision to eliminate the presumption, there will still 
be an incentive to produce the opinion because it will be hard to rebut a 
claim of willfulness if the underlying infringement ultimately is found to 
have occurred. Inevitably, there will be scenarios where a defendant’s 
decision to not produce an opinion, as a result of the Knorr-Bremse 
decision, will work to their advantage. But for the vast majority of cases, 
an opinion of counsel will remain the best evidence to rebut a claim of 
willfulness. Therefore, the goals of the majority opinion in Knorr-
Bremse appear to remain unfulfilled. If this is true, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Knorr-Bremse did not really change very much at all. 
V. IMPROVEMENT: APPLICATION OF SELECTIVE WAIVER 
If accused patent infringers continue to regularly seek opinions of 
counsel and thereafter waive attorney-client privilege in order to offer an 
opinion to defeat a willful infringement claim, the “inappropriate burdens 
on the attorney-client relationship”167 inevitably remain strong despite 
the elimination of the adverse inference by the Federal Circuit in Knorr-
Bremse. Defendants are not likely to change their behavior as a result of 
the Knorr-Bremse holding. The dilemma of alleged patent infringers will 
continue until the Federal Circuit revisits the premise of exculpatory 
opinions in patent infringement suits. 
If the Federal Circuit permitted defendants to offer an opinion of 
counsel as exculpatory evidence without necessarily waiving attorney-
client privilege, the central goals of Knorr-Bremse would be achieved. 
Such a system would amount to a selective waiver process whereby a 
defendant would not be forced to comply with overzealous discovery 
requests by plaintiffs.168 Selective waiver is generally considered to be 
unfair because it allows a party to use communications borne out of the 
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attorney-client privilege as both a “cloak and dagger.” Although certain 
new dangers would exist, a selective waiver system would be most 
equitable in patent infringement litigation. As it currently stands, 
plaintiffs are able to unfairly exploit accused infringers by forcing 
competitors to spend large amounts of money on, perhaps gratuitous, 
exculpatory opinions when the plaintiff obtains a new patent. Plaintiffs 
are also able to abuse defendants when, simply as matter of routine, they 
add a claim of willful infringement, thereby forcing defendants into the 
classic “Hobson’s Choice.” Because the risk of Rule 11 violations are 
extremely low for plaintiffs, their use of a willfulness allegation amounts 
to an unfair dagger in an accused infringer’s defense strategy. Despite the 
Federal Circuit’s efforts, the Knorr-Bremse decision has not alleviated 
the defendant’s quandary. A selective waiver system, however, would 
help level the playing field. 
For all of its benefits, a selective waiver system does present new 
risks. Such a system may create an environment where lawyers are less 
candid in written opinions because they will be able to supplement their 
legal advice through other means. Most important, other 
communications, such as meetings with a client, would not be 
discoverable under this system. On its face, therefore, it appears as 
though a selective waiver system would promote the so-called “window 
dressing” opinion practice, or perhaps even create a market for the “say-
anything-lawyer.” The likelihood that these counterproductive practices 
will occur, however, is not as substantial as it may appear. District courts 
currently analyze exculpatory opinions drafted by lawyers very carefully. 
To be considered competent, an opinion must satisfy many substantive 
requirements.169 Significantly, opinions must: be rendered by attorney’s 
who are “proficient in patent matters”;170 opinions must “evidence an 
adequate foundation based on a review of all necessary facts [that] is not 
merely conclusory on its face, presenting only a superficial or off-the-
cuff analysis”;171 and an “opinion [must] indicate[] that it is based on a 
review of the file history of the patent, the prior art of record, and, 
possibly, additional prior art.”172 Although an attorney will inevitably 
tailor an opinion in a light most favorable to his client, an attorney must 
nevertheless write truthfully and exhaustively about potential 
infringement claims in order to satisfy these substantive exculpatory 
                                                                                                             
 169 See HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 58, § 9.07[10], 9-118 to 9-119, for an 
exhaustive list of factors a court will consider when evaluating the competency and 
authoritativeness of an exculpatory opinion. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
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opinion requirements. Responsible lawyering will continue as long as 
trial courts remain critical and demanding of attorney opinions. 
Plaintiffs will not be burdened unfairly by a selective waiver 
system. The production of an exculpatory opinion, by itself, does not 
oblige a trier of fact to find a lack of willfulness. If a court determines, 
based on a totality of the circumstances review, that a defendant was 
willful—in spite of the existence of an exculpatory opinion—plaintiffs 
will nevertheless obtain adequate relief. A selective waiver system will 
continue to encourage defendants to seek legal opinions, and at the same 
time, eliminate the unfair dilemma associated with attorney-client 
privilege waiver. 
A selective waiver system does not alleviate the financial burden on 
defendants to seek advice of counsel. Due to the continued viability of a 
(however subdued) negative inference, in the totality of the 
circumstances review, the Knorr-Bremse holding did not diminish this 
burden either. Selective waiver, however, has the potential to accomplish 
the unrealized goal of the Federal Circuit to reduce the unfair burdens on 
the attorney-client relationship. 
In a curious result, if the Federal Circuit adopted a selective waiver 
system, the pre-Knorr-Bremse “adverse inference,” arguably, would be 
appropriate. In fact, in a selective waiver system, the original goal of the 
“adverse inference,”—to permit a trier of fact to make a reasonable 
assumption about an accused infringer’s subjective understanding 
regarding the risk of infringement—would be realized. Aside from 
financial reasons, no longer would defendants stand to lose as much by 
withholding the attorney’s opinion in discovery. If in selective waiver 
system the production of the opinion does not result in waiver of 
attorney-client privilege, an “adverse inference” would further promote 
responsible behavior on the part of defendants. 
Although a defendant may have other legitimate reasons for not 
producing an opinion, even in a selective waiver system, these risks may 
be reduced substantially if the opinion is drafted responsibly (i.e. such 
that the opinion does not offer too much advice such that it would 
necessarily hinder future litigation strategy, but would nevertheless offer 
a client proper analysis of his current situation). Hence, under a selective 
waiver system, the “adverse inference” that existed prior to the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse would be practicable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse to eliminate the 
“adverse inference” was unanimously supported by the legal community. 
Despite this support, however, it appears as though the goals, which 
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prompted the court’s change in law, will not be realized. In the wake of 
the decision, defendants will likely continue to be burdened by the cost 
of obtaining opinions of counsel when facing a possible willful 
infringement charge. Defendants will also likely feel compelled to offer 
that opinion as evidence of its good faith, thereby waiving attorney-client 
privilege. The elimination of the “adverse inference” does not reconcile 
the fact that courts must continue to consider the defendant’s conduct 
based on a “totality of the circumstances” review. The elimination of the 
inference does not change the fact that, in a “totality of the 
circumstances” determination, a defendant’s best defense against a 
willfulness claim is an exculpatory opinion. 
The Federal Circuit could alleviate this dilemma, I propose, if it 
adopts a selective waiver system that permits a defendant to offer an 
opinion of counsel while not requiring waiver of attorney-client 
privilege. Although this system presents new risks, such a system would 
help create a more equitable litigation environment in patent 
infringement suits. 
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